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R2P and Intervention after Libya
John W. Dietrich, Bryant University

Abstract: In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS) released a report arguing that states and the
international community have a responsibility to protect (R2P) citizens
from major human rights violations and war crimes. The coming years
saw much discussion of the concept and supportive votes at the U.N., but
there was little practical implementation. In 2011, world events and U.N.
action breathed new life into R2P. Libya was the first case of the U.N.
using R2P to authorize the use of force against an existing state to protect
civilians. Debates over Libya before the authorization of force, and
discussions of the mission both as it continued and afterward show that
there remain deep divisions within the international community over key
issues in authorizing and implementing R2P intervention.For an emerging
norm, perhaps the only thing worse than being ignored is being
implemented in a way that reinforces old fears and raises new
controversies. The Libyan case already has shaped discussions of possible
action in Syria. R2P has been dealt a severe setback, so it will not emerge
as a meaningful new norm, will not serve as the justification of new
interventions, and may in some cases actually delay the adoption of less
coercive responses to human rights violations.

1. Introduction
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the international
community was struggling with the challenge of reconciling
the core concepts of state sovereignty and protection of
human rights. In 2001, the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a panel of
international experts chaired by Gareth Evans and
Mohammed Sahnoun, released a report arguing that states
have a responsibility to protect (R2P) their citizens from
major human rights violations and war crimes. If a state
fails to meet this responsibility, the international community
should be prepared to take action to protect citizens. R2P
quickly drew major international attention and debate. A
version of R2P language was adopted at the U.N.’s 2005
World Summit and theU.N. Security Council indicated
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support for some R2P language in Resolution 1674 in 2006.
R2P seemed to be moving rapidly through the norm life-cycle
identified by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) beginning with
norm emergence, followed by a norm cascade as states and
international organizations accept the norm, heading toward
internalization when states are guided by the norm, and into
full customary international law. Subsequent years, though,
revealed that many countries had not fully accepted key R2P
concepts, that its language had been watered down as it
progressed from ICISS report to U.N. statements, and that,
most crucially, it was not being implemented to address
ongoing human rights cases in Sudan, Sri Lanka, Somalia
and elsewhere.
Academics and policymakers began to
question whether R2P would ever become more than just a
nice slogan (Evans 2008b; Hehir 2010; Reinold 2010). These
discussions highlight that one of the worst things for an
emerging norm is for it to be ignored.
In 2011, world events and U.N. action breathed new life
into R2P. The concept was employed in Cote d’Ivoire and
then, more dramatically, in Libya. Libya was the first case of
the U.N. using R2P to authorize the use of force against an
existing state to protect civilians.
Supporters of the
concepthailed the actions as an important next step in
moving the world from words to actions. Evans, for example,
argued that at the outset Libya was “a textbook case of the
RtoP norm working exactly as it was supposed to” (Evans
2011).In article entitled “End of the Argument,” Evans
further argued that there was now “overwhelming
consensus” on at least the main principles of R2P (Evans
2011b).
Over time, though, it has become apparent that the
debates over Libya before the authorization of force, and
discussions of the mission both as it continued and
afterward show that there remain deep divisions over key
issues. Three of these key issues center on the decision to
authorize an intervention and reflect issues that have been
contentious for decades:1) countries continue to disagree
over how much weight should be given to sovereignty;2) the
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vagueness of R2P criteria lead some countries to fear that
decisions of when and where to intervene will always reflect
political considerations as much as humanitarian issues; 3)
questions remain over which groups can properly authorize
an R2P intervention and what to do when the U.N. Security
Council is deadlocked. The Libya case also moved R2P from
theory into action and thus showedthree issues of proper
implementation that previously had received less attention,
but
reinforced
divisions
in
the
international
community:1)which forces should carry out the intervention
on behalf of the international community?2)what should be
the political and military goals of the intervention? 3) what
responsibility does the international community have after
an R2P intervention? These discussions about Libya show
that, for an emerging norm, perhaps the only thing worse
than being ignored is being implemented in a way that
reinforces old fears and raises new controversies.
The full impact of the Libyan case on R2P may not be
known for years since the passage of time can lead to
different conclusions than immediate analysis, and because
interventions are often judged by their long-term outcomes
and Libya’s future still remains uncertain. In the short term,
though, the Libyan case has dealt a severe blow to R2P and
complicated international responses to violence.The limited
influence of post-Libya R2P can be seen in international
responses to early violence in Syria. The Syrian situation
has continued to progress to become a multi-factional civil
war far beyond what R2P was designed to address, so the
focus is really why little action was taken in 2011 or early
2012 before the situation spiraled.
Supporters will point out that R2P includes preventative
aspects and that military action is not the only form of
intervention,but R2P really cannot be fully separated from
forceful humanitarian intervention. First, the whole concept
stemmed from an effort to address the challenges of
humanitarian intervention.
Second, interventions draw
public attention and focus policymakers’ debates in different
ways than prevention or less dramatic interventions, so
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forceful interventions will shape overall perceptions of
R2Pand likely influence the level of global support for other
aspects of R2P. Therefore, although R2P is not a synonym
for humanitarian intervention, the concepts are so
interwoven that supporters must address many of the same
challenges
that
limited
support
for
humanitarian
intervention.
This is why almost all observers, both
supporters and critics, recognized that the first major R2P
intervention would be a shaping event for the norm’s
future.The term will likely continue to be used in coming
years in relation to preventative and other actions, but these
actions could have been taken in any case, so R2P may be
changing the terms of discussion, but it is not creating any
significant new action.
On the key issue ofinternational interventions, R2P is
quite weak after the Libya case. In coming years, it will not
emerge as a meaningful new norm, will not serve as the
justification of new interventions, and may in some cases
actually delay the adoption of less coercive responses to
human rights violations.This leaves the international
community much where it was at the turn of the century in
trying to weigh political and practical challenges against
desires to end mass violations of human rights. It is,
therefore, useful to trace a little history before examining the
six issues raised by R2P and how they played out in the
Libyan case.

2. Developing R2P
The modern idea of humanitarian intervention first rose
to prominence in the 1990s as the end of the Cold War
increased the chance for global cooperation, shifted focus to
regional issues, but also saw the outbreak of new intra-state
conflicts.
The U.N. authorized actions in Somalia and
Bosnia in 1992. Neither mission was a full success and the
U.N.’s inaction in Rwanda in 1994 seemed to confirm that,
although there was some desire to protect civilians and
others from abuses,it often was outweighed by major
political and practical barriers to successful intervention.
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The latter half of the 1990s saw leadership of interventions
shift more toward regional groups and actors. For example,
West African forces intervened in Sierra Leone and Liberia,
U.S. forces in Haiti, and Australian forces in East Timor.
This trend to regional groups was highlighted by NATO
actions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. These
regional actions proved more coordinated and forceful than
the U.N. actions, but raised the crucial issue of whether
intervention without U.N. approval was illegal.
In the
famous words of the Independent International Commission
on Kosovo, NATO’s intervention was “illegal but legitimate”
(Independent, 2000, 4).
In developed countries, this wave of interventions led to
debates over when countries should act outside of their
national interests to protect civilians in other countries and
what resources and sacrifices were justifiable in such cases.
Less developed countries (LDCs) were frequently more
critical of the interventions. In a famous piece, Mohammed
Ayoobargued that LDCs saw the interventionsas a violation
of state sovereignty, a new form of Western imperialism, and
driven by double standards in that Western countries and
allies were immune from focus (2004).Anotherscholar
summarized sentiment saying, “at the turn of the century, it
has become clear that the concept of HI [humanitarian
intervention] has no future; that it is not acceptable to the
majority of U.N. member states” (Gierycz, 2010, 112).
The ICISS 2001 report and other efforts to develop R2P
attempted to move away from the terms and specific policies
of humanitarian intervention, but continue to build on the
sentiment that international actions should be taken to
protect civilians. The focus shifted from a right to intervene
to a responsibility to protect, and from a focus on sovereignty
granting control to “sovereignty as responsibility” (ICISS
2001). States retained the prime responsibility for protecting
their citizens from genocide, mass murder, and ethnic
cleansing, but if the state was unable or unwilling to meet its
responsibilities then the principle of non-intervention could
be set aside and the international community should
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consider action. The report argued that intervention should
be supplemented with policies of prevention and post-conflict
peace building. It also argued that military force was only
one form of intervention. Thus, “The ICISS sandwiched
military force between the sliced white bread of prevention
and postconflict peacebuilding. . . [so] the option of military
intervention to protect human lives became somewhat more
palatable than it had been, especially in the global South”
(Weiss 2011, 2). The report also argued that specific
casesshould be judged usingJust War criteria such as would
the intervention stop gross violations of rights, was force
reserved as a last resort, and did the intervention have a
reasonable prospect of success. The ICISS placed primary
responsibility for authorization in the U.N. Security Council,
but suggested that the five permanent members agree to not
use their veto power unless vital national interests were at
stake. Furthermore, a deadlocked Security Council could be
addressed by going to the General Assembly or regional
groups.
R2P was explicitly endorsed in two paragraphs of the
U.N.’s 2005 World Summit Outcomes Document.
This
inclusion was a victory for R2P supporters, but, because it
came after several years of questions and criticisms being
raised, several compromises were made that weakened the
concept compared to the ICISS report. The result was “R2P
lite” (Weiss 2007, 117). Authorization was put firmly back in
the Security Council’s hands, but the idea of limiting vetoes
was rejected by China, Russia, and the United States. The
Just War criteria were not formally included in U.N.
statements. Protection would occur in cases of genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleaning and crimes against humanity,
but there was no further clarification on the required level of
these threats, and the need for intervention was to be judged
on a case-by-case basis. The threshold for a state failing to
meet its responsibilities was raised to “manifest failure.”
There also was no stated obligation to act, only a call for
preparation to take action.
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Even with the weakened language, subsequent years saw
a degree of “buyer’s remorse” among certain states that
further weakened R2P implementationfollowing the 2005
World Summit (Evans 2008, 288). Several states such as
Algeria, Brazil, and Egypt argued that the 2005 agreement
called for further study and debate, rather than immediate
implementation. Key countries, including Russia and China,
renewed concerns about sovereignty and non-intervention.
In 2006, Security Council Resolution 1674 broadly
supported R2P, but only after the resolution was watered
down to just reaffirming the 2005 wording. In subsequent
years, criticisms and back-sliding continued and there were
no cases of authorized R2P intervention.
Overall, R2P’s development shows that several important
issues, discussed in more detail below, remain.
Compromises were made to move the process along. These
compromises weakened R2P from the ICISS vision, yet were
not been enough to quell critics. Most countries had agreed
to R2P in broad principle, but it remained up to each
country to define what that meant in practice. To move R2P
forward, some academic supporters and UN officials sought
to distance R2P from humanitarian intervention and focus
more on prevention (Bellamy 2009). These prevention efforts
certainly have merit, but R2P really cannot be fully
separated from forceful humanitarian intervention and the
challenges that brings.

3.1 Sovereignty
Over the last century, there has been a growing
development of international norms and laws protecting
individual human rights. This movement always has had to
deal with the issue of how to balance the state’s right of
sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs with the
individuals’ rights. This issue is of course dramatically
highlighted by cases of humanitarian intervention directly
aimed at changing state behavior and, in many cases,
seeking regime change. Concerns over sovereignty were
central to many developing countries’ worries in the 1990s
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and the development of R2P has brought back those same
worries. Additionally, R2P has sought to redefine sovereignty
and alter existing notions of its benefits and obligations.
Issues of sovereignty and non-interference are commonly
raised by LDCs. Ayoob has argued that these countries are
particularly sensitive to the loss of sovereignty because they
have only just achieved independence from colonialism
(2004).
The memory of colonialism also makes them
sensitive to the idea of Great Powers interfering in domestic
politics. Further, their state of development may make them
worry that they will be targeted for intervention. Many
developing countries have multiple ethnic groups, so there is
a chance of ethnic violence. Many are weaker states that
may be challenged by internal groups and feel the need to
use repression and violence to keep order. Many European
states had violent pasts, but today the rules have shifted and
internal violence risks international intervention.
During the 1990s, developing countries repeatedly
opposed interventions on the grounds that they violated
sovereignty. In 2000, the South Summit of 122 states
rejected “the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention
which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in
the general principles of international law” (Gierycz 2010,
125). India, Brazil, South Africa and other leading LDCs
have, at times, expressed similar feelings.
In 2001
discussions of the R2P report, the Chinese delegation
argued, “the assertion of ‘human rights transcending
sovereignty’ has serious fallacies in theory and lends no help
to the legalization of humanitarian intervention” (Ayoob,
2004, 108). Importantly, Russia has voiced similar views, so
two veto-wielding powers often seek to defend the existing
concept of strong sovereignty.
R2P reframed the sovereignty issue, but reactions have
been similar to humanitarian intervention. In 2005, India’s
ambassador argued that discussions of R2P must not be
allowed to confer legitimacy on a right of intervention. The
Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
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observed there were “similarities” between R2P and
humanitarian intervention and reasserted that there was no
right to intervention (Bellamy 112). Ayoob has again warned
that the Great Powers are creating legal justifications for the
interventions they always desired (Ayoob 2002). It should be
noted that the LDCs are not united in opposition as many
countries in Africa and Latin America have expressed
support for the R2P concept or for particular actions.
To some observers, raising issues of sovereignty may
conjure an image of an abusive dictator hiding behind a legal
curtain, but it must be remembered that sovereignty has
been a bedrock principle of international law for centuries,
referenced by the powerful as well as the weak, the good as
well as the bad, so alterations in the definition must be
carefully considered by the international community as a
whole.
R2P’s logic that sovereignty brings certain
responsibilities builds off the work of U.N. advisors Roberta
Cohen and Francis Deng (Cohen and Deng 1998).
International legal terms are flexible and develop through
usage, but it is unrealistic to expect that the entire
international community would shift its understanding of a
centuries-old core principle within just a few years. If
countries do not accept the redefinition, then the sovereignty
discussion will play out much like it has for decades and few
R2P interventions will be authorized. These views were
nicely captured by the Head of Mission of amajor G77
country when he noted, “The concept of responsibility to
protect does not exist except in the minds of the Western
imperialists” (Evans 2008, 55).
From the above discussion, it is noteworthy, and probably
surprising to some doubters, that in the Libyan case the
U.N. did authorize the use of all means necessary to protect
civilians. This shows sovereignty concerns can be overcome,
but Libya was a highly unusual situation, furthermore the
actions taken in Libya reinforced LDC worries, so a repeat
elsewhere is far from guaranteed.
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In early discussions of Libya, several countries resisted
the use of force or even sanctions. Russia and China led
calls for a ceasefire and internal Libyan solution, and were
supported by India, Brazil and Germany. Eventual, forceful
action in Libya was driven by a number of factors. First,
conditions for civilians continued to worsen and a massacre
of civilians appeared imminent.
Gaddafihad directly
threatened to kill civilians who opposed him.
Second,
Gaddafi did not have good relations with many regional
leaders and Libya did not have major ties to either Russia or
China.
Third, several regional organizations called for
intervention, so it became easier for Russia and China, but
also the United States, to say that they were following the
will of the community. Rarely will these factors all come
together again.
Even with the factors supporting intervention, Resolution
1973 explicitly rejected “a foreign occupation force of any
form on any part of Libyan territory.” Enforcing a no-fly zone
would affect sovereignty, but in a less direct way. The
Resolution passed 10-0, with Russia, China, India, Brazil
and Germany all abstaining. The abstentions show that
many significant international actors did not fully accepted
R2P’s challenge to sovereignty. Those abstaining cited their
long-standing views on non-intervention and preference for a
political solution, but by that point the political pressure not
to block action was significant, so they chose to abstain not
veto.

3.2 Lack of Criteria and Politicization
International norms and customary law always allow a
degree of interpretation and thus can be flexible to meet
particular circumstances. The downside of flexibility is that
political calculations may shape interpretation leading to
inconsistent application of laws across time and across
cases.
This inconsistency leads to claims of political
agendas and double standards. The 1990s interventions
were particularly susceptible to these accusations because
there was neither an accepted legal definition of
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humanitarian intervention nor established criteria for action.
There were frequent complaints that Western allies,
particularly Israel, were given a free pass, while enemies of
the West faced international action. There also was a feeling
that problems in Yugoslavia and Haiti were addressed
quickly because they were geographically close to major
powers, while much worse problems in African countries
were allowed to continue.
The language adopted at the 2005 World Summit,
reinforced by the Security Council, moved R2P beyond
humanitarian intervention in establishing a politically and
legally binding set of standards (Gierycz).
The R2P
standards are, though, intentionally vague on a number of
points. Countries must protect their citizens, but there are
no firm guidelines for when a state has crossed the line.
This vagueness will inevitably trigger political battles--one
need only think of the many disputes over what constitutes
genocide that have occurred even after acceptance of the
1948 Conventionon the Prevention and Punishmentofthe
Crime of Genocide. Second, international action should
come when states are “manifestly failing to protect their
populations.” Again, there will be debate over when such a
condition exists. Third, the international community has the
“responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian
and other peaceful means,” and only consider force “should
peaceful means be inadequate.” These ideas follow the Just
War principle of last resort, but could allow for long debates
about whether peaceful means have been exhausted. For all
of these reasons, R2P is left as a case-by-case decision and
one that carries no legal obligation to act. This lack of
specificity is intentional. It is favored by countries wary of
R2P who do not want to give it further legitimacy with set
standards, but it is also favored by the Great Powers who do
not want to have their political options reduced. This leaves
the world with little more clarity than existed with
humanitarian
intervention.
Thus,
complaints
of
inconsistency are sure to reemerge.
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As previously mentioned, in the Libyan case, several key
countries favored continued political pressure and
negotiation rather than force. If Gaddafi had shown a true
interest in meeting with foreign negotiators and had made
some strategic concessions, he potentially could have
delayed or prevented action, much as Sudan has done in the
case of Darfur. The fact that action was taken in Libya then
opens the question of why there was no equivalent action in
Bahrain, or Yemen where the Western countries have
stronger political ties. The perceived Western bias of R2P
was highlighted just days after the U.N. authorized force,
when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin commented, “In
general, it reminds me of a medieval call for a crusade” (Levy
and Shanker 2011). Overall, there is no simple solution to
the complications brought by vague terms, but that very
point means that critics will continue to see R2P as a
selective, political tool.

3.3 Authorization
A major reason why both humanitarian intervention, and
R2P, has been perceived as politically driven and selective is
because of the workings of the U.N. Security Council. The
Council is a political body, gives major power to the five
permanent seats, and its voting rules can often end in
stalemate. Even with these issues, a vast majority of states
would rather the U.N. have the authority to authorize R2P
rather than to allow unilateral action by Great Powers or
regional groups. It is therefore a matter of how to make the
best of an imperfect situation.
The U.N.’s failure to agree on action in Rwanda and
Kosovo were prominent issues as R2P was being formulated.
The ICISS argued that all R2P actions should seek Security
Council approval to reinforce the importance of the U.N. and
sustain international law. The ICISS, though, also suggested
three further points on authorization. First, permanent
members should follow a code of conduct under which they
would not veto R2P actions unless there was a vital national
interest at stake. This idea may have intellectual merit, but
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it was dead on arrival in the real world. The veto, of course,
goes back to the founding of the U.N. and was seen as a way
of enticing the Great Powers into the U.N. The veto, and the
threat of a veto, has given the powers major leverage that
they have never been willing to limit in any previous U.N.
reform package. Their view was recently restated by Putin
who wrote to a Russian and foreign audience, “Let me
remind you that the veto right is not a whim but an integral
part of the global system, codified in the U.N. Charter, by the
way, at the insistence of the United States” (No “Libyan
scenario” 2012). The idea of a code was simply dropped as
discussion of R2P moved forward in the U.N.
The ICISS also suggested that, if the Security Council did
not act, the issue could be taken to the General Assembly
through the “Uniting for Peace” resolution. This resolution
dates to 1950, when western powers were trying to assure
that the Soviet Union could not block action aiding South
Korea. The resolution states that when the Security Council
fails to act to maintain international peace and security, the
General Assembly can issue recommendations.
The
legitimacy of the resolution is questioned by those who argue
that it contradicts the Charter’s allocation of duties, plus the
legal weight of General Assembly resolutions is minimal. In
any case, for R2P, any potential General Assembly role was
negated by the 2005 World Summit document thatdirectly
reaffirmed the Security Council as the legitimate forum for
authorization.
The ICISS further noted that in cases of Security Council
inaction, concerned states may still wish to act. They
discouraged unilateral action, given fears of political motives
and a further weakening of the U.N., but suggested that
there could be actions by regional groups and retrospective
legitimacy given by Security Council approval. Interestingly,
the Libyan case shows regional groups playing a different
role, not as independent actors, but as “gatekeepers” for U.N.
action (Bellamy 2011, 841).
On March 7, the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) called on the Security Council to
use all means necessary to protect civilians.
The
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Organization of Islamic Countries issued a similar
statement, but with direct emphasis that no foreign ground
troops should be involved. The African Union was more
cautious as it criticized Libya, but did not call for forceful
intervention. The key group, though, was the League of Arab
States (LAS).
The LAS called for a no-fly zone and
establishment of protected safe areas for civilians. The LAS
statement help tip the United States to support the use of
force. It also made it more difficult for Russia and China to
oppose the use of force, although they still could use the
threat of a veto to keep the force’s mandate limited.
With the code of conduct and General Assembly ideas
removed, R2P authorization rests firmly with the Security
Council. In the past, this has allowed China and Russia to
end discussions of actions in Myanmar and Sri Lanka and to
modify actions in the Libyan case. Regional groups pushing
R2P in the Libyan case contributed to action, but
thisdevelopment raises long-term questions.
If regional
groups act as gatekeepers, can they veto operations they
oppose? Can they ever pressure the U.N. to take actions that
the Great Powers oppose? There also are questions of what
group should be considered the true spokesperson for a
region. R2P thus will either have to move forward with a
highly political and divided U.N., or with a complicated and
likely controversial multi-tiered authorization system. These
are not problems for R2P alone, but since these same
problems about authorizing action on other issues have not
generated significant U.N. reform, it is unlikely that R2P will.

3.4 Whose Forces and Decisions
Over its first decade, R2P remained largely a theoretical
concept, so most discussion centered on questions of
triggering actions. Now, more attention needs to be focused
on implementation issues. A leading concern here comes
from another U.N. structural issue, namely that there is no
U.N. army or standing peacekeeping force.
Some R2P
actions may be delayed, or even never implemented, if no
countries are willing to volunteer their forces and material.
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Further, U.N. forces will be weak if they are drawn mainly
from LDC armies. As of 2011, the ten top troop-contributing
countries for peacekeeping were Bangladesh, Pakistan,India,
Nigeria,Ethiopia, Nepal, Egypt, Jordan, Rwanda, and Ghana.
Some of these countries have highly regarded troops, but the
lack of major power involvement is still a problem if R2P
missions are to be successful.
In cases where major powers do volunteer forces, the
larger problem becomes that those countries will then expect
to make the decisions on military tactics and goals. This
further politicizes the action and raises the risk that there
will be a mismatch between the original authorizing
resolution and actions taken on the ground. For example,
the initial stages of 1992 intervention in Somalia involved
almost exclusively U.S. troops. The mission therefore was
seen by some as a U.S. intervention, with U.N. cover. In
time, other countries’ troops and officials arrived, and the
U.N. was given responsibility and authority, but tensions
then emerged between U.S. and U.N. officials.
There
remained heavy U.S. influence until U.S. troops were
removed in 1993, anaction that effectively meant that the
U.N. needed to end its involvement. It was therefore largely
the United States that was making decisions for the
international community.
In the case of Libya, the U.N. authorized member states
“acting nationally or through regional organizations” to use
all means necessary. England and France led many of the
initial strikes.
The United States was active, although
President Obama announced that U.S.troops would quickly
assume a supporting role focused on intelligence,
logistics,and search and rescue.
A seniorWhite House
official noted that Obama always stressed that US
involvement should be“days, not weeks” (Cooper and Myers
2011).On March31, formal control of the Libyan mission was
transferred to NATO.
The shift to NATO control broadened the number of
countries involved, but still left England, France, and the
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United States as the military and political leaders. At
anApril 14 meeting of Foreign Ministers from NATO Allies
and non-NATO Partners,the alliance committed to using all
necessary resources and operational flexibility to meet the
U.N. mandate until all attacks on civilians and civilianpopulated areas ended, the Libyan government had
withdrawn all military and para-military forces to bases, and
the government permitted immediate, full, safe and
unhindered access to humanitarian aid for the Libyan
people. These new goals did not directly contradict the
original U.N. resolution, but they were a modification and
showed that the power of decision on specific goals often
goes to those who advance the troops. China, Russia, South
Africa and other soon claimed that NATO was not following
the U.N. mandated goals, but could do little directly since
their troops were not involved.
Jonathan Eyal has correctly argued that the move to
NATO control
sharpened divisions in the UN, damaged the moral
authority of the operation in the eyes of doubters and
confirmed all the conspiracy theories of those who argued
that R2P is nothing more but a new justification for some
old-style Western intervention (C, 58).
If future R2P missions are authorized, careful
consideration should be given to who will actually lead the
forces.
Who leads the mission has a large impact on the tactics
chosen. In Libya, the first tactics chosen resembled those of
Kosovo. Airstrikes again proved to be militarily impressive,
but an imprecise tactic as both civilians and fighters seeking
to oust Gadaffi were killed and civilian infrastructure was
damaged. NATO forces bombed government forces near
rebel strongholds, but also support facilities, command
centers, and government offices. Within days of Resolution
1973’s approval, Chinese, Russian and other officials were
calling for an end to bombing, noting that civilians were
being killed in a mission designed to protect civilians. They
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were later sharply critical of attacks that killed members of
Gadaffi’s family. In all, NATO aircraft flew nearly 10,000
strike missions. Had foreign ground troops been introduced,
civilian deaths still would have occurred, but possibly would
have been reduced, but the idea of ground troops was ruled
out not on the comparative cost-benefit to civilian protection
or on military grounds, but rather on political grounds.
Russia and China would not have supported ground troops
and Western powers were wary of placing troops in another
Muslim country.
The issue of blunted tactics became
increasingly obvious as the war stretched from weeks into
months and would have become even more glaring had it
dragged into years of engagement. Ground troops may not
be appropriate for every R2P operation, but if they are simply
taken off the table, R2P will struggle to reach its goal of
protecting civilians.
A second tactic highlighted by the Libyan case is the
arming and training of insurgents. Resolution 1973 that
authorized all means necessary build on Resolution 1970
passed weeks earlier. Resolution 1970 established an arms
embargo on Libya and Resolution 1973 appeared to reinforce
that policy. Members of the British Foreign Office, though,
argued that 1973 allowed for the provision of defensive
weapons if the weapons would aid the goal of protecting
civilians (Eyal 2012). States such as Qatar sent weapons to
the insurgents with at least the knowledge, if not the active
support, of NATO officials. The difficulty of course is that
once weapons enter a theatre it becomes impossible to
control their future use. The insurgents mounted major
offensives again regime strongholds that placed civilians in
jeopardy. Later the U.N. Human Rights Council reported
that “the thuwar (anti-Qadhafi forces) committed serious
violations, including war crimes and breaches of
international human rights law” (U.N. Human Rights
Council, 2012, 2). Furthermore, after the war, the arms held
by various factions have been a major source of instability in
Libya and the broader region. These experiences highlight
several issues. First, if an R2P mission is supposed to
protect civilians, it may need to protect them from
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insurgents as well as from existing regimes. Second, arming
factions in the short-term can have complicated and
uncertain long-term consequences.
The Libyan experience may lead some countries to want
more explicit military goals and rules of engagement
included in resolutions.
Requirement for more details,
though, could further delay approval of resolutions as details
are explored and debated. Countries putting their troops at
risk may then chafe at the idea of others making military
decisions for their soldiers. An alternative would be to pass
resolutions more frequently, so that they can adjust to
changing circumstances on the ground. This approach,
though, would require repeated diplomatic work and would
risk having missions terminated or significantly altered
halfway through. All together, these practical difficulties of
finding troops and setting tactics reduce the overall
likelihood of future R2P missions.

3.5 Appropriate Goals
A main goal of humanitarian intervention is to stop
human rights violations and war crimes. R2P espouses a
similar goal of protecting civilians from those crimes. How
best to achieve this goal is not always clear. Outside forces
could, for example, set up safe havens for civilians or
establish corridors for humanitarian aid. There could be
efforts to negotiate a ceasefire.
There could be more
dramatic actions to address the violations at their root by
bringing regime change or defeat of one faction in a civil war.
These are very different types of actions, so thought should
be given to which objective is most likely to be necessary and
the chosen objective should be made clear up front, so that
those authorizing force understand what they are agreeing to
do.
In the 1990s, theU.N. favored tactics at the less
aggressive end of the spectrum in part because this
lessenedchallenges to sovereignty and increased the chance
of global support. Forces were sent in as “impartial” actors.
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Writing about these interventions, Richard Betts has made
the strong case that impartiality is in fact a “delusion”
(1994). Using force always will change the dynamics on the
ground and thus the political outcome, so it is never fully
impartial. Further, Edward N. Luttwak(1999) has argued
that the steps taken by outside observers at times may
actually make situations worse in the long-run. Establishing
safe havens encourages civilians to stay in a region and thus
remain in harm’s way if the safe haven fails. Ceasefires do
not resolve the underlying political dispute, so violence may
restart in the future and, in the meantime, forces may
regroup and rearm so that the second wave of violence is
worse than the first.
Despite these existing ideas, R2P supporters often implied
that interventions could be apolitical operations protecting
civilians while not radically altering local political power.
The Libya case calls this idea further question as the
operation’s ultimate goal slid toward regime change.
Resolution 1973 made no mention of regime change and had
that idea explicitly been included, it is almost certain the
resolution would have faced a Russian or Chinese veto. Just
days after the resolution, however, leaders such as David
Cameron of Great Britain, Nicolas Sarkozy of Franceand
Obamabegan arguing that Gaddafi must be removed from
leadership as the only way to assure long-term security for
civilians. Further, from a practical perspective, the longer
the fighting continued, the harder it became to imagine any
result short of Gaddafi’s removal. If he remained in power,
there would have been a day when Gaddafi could reignite his
efforts to crush the opposition. Also, with the statements of
key leaders, NATO’s reputation was increasingly tied to
bringing about regime change.
Not surprisingly, countries wary of any intervention
sharply opposed the drift toward the goal of regime change.
In April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued, “The
U.N. Security Council never aimed to topple the Libyan
regime. All those who are currently using the U.N. resolution
for that aim are violating the U.N. mandate” (NATO 2011). In
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May 2011, in a Security Council debate on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict, China bluntly warned that
“[t]here must be no attempt at regime change ... under the
guise of protecting civilians (Protection 2011). Russian,
Chinese and other diplomats suggested that they had been
tricked into agreeing to an R2P mission only to see it become
a regime change mission (Garwood-Gowers 2012). There
also was criticism that NATO operations ended almost as
soon as Gadaffi was captured and killed despite ongoing
violence in the country.
Academics have argued that the shift from R2P to regime
change alters the moral legitimacy of the action. James
Pattison (2011) argues that Just War theory could support a
R2P mission in Libya since there were sufficient reasons to
act and there would be low costs. However, there was not
sufficient cause for a Just War of regime change and that
goal would bring such high costs that “this bar is unlikely to
have been met in Libya.”
In the wake of the Libyan experience, some observers
therefore have suggested that the way to rescue R2P is to
separate it from the controversial idea of regime change
(Western and Goldstein 2013).The problem with this idea is
that in many cases, R2P interventions will require regime
change to be fully effective. Even those that do not require
full regime change will need to greatly alter the local political
balance, since if existing governments were willing and able
to protect their citizens, they would have taken those steps
to avoid the intervention. Saying upfront that regime change
is necessary or even likely will make missions more
controversial and less often approved. Announcing regime
change only once operations have begun will lead to poorly
coordinated actions and resentment. Ultimately, widespread
international acceptance that certain situations require
regime change is needed, but such acceptance is unlikely to
emerge often in today’s political climate, so this is a major
problem for R2P in the future.
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3.6 Post-conflict Rebuilding
The ICISS report and subsequent U.N. documents have
argued that R2P needs to move beyond prevention and
action to consider rebuilding after interventions. As the
report described it:
Too often in the past the responsibility to rebuild has
been insufficientlyrecognized, the exit of the interveners
has been poorly managed, the commitmentto help with
reconstruction has been inadequate, and countries have
found themselves atthe end of the day still wrestling with
the
underlying
problems
that
produced
the
originalintervention action (ICISS 2001).
These issues historically have received much less
academic and policy attention.
Also, frustrations over
troops' deaths in cases such as Somalia, and over long-term
commitments with no clear end such as in Bosnia and
Kosovo, have meant that much of the focus that has been
given to post-conflict issues has been on developing exit
strategies that seek to end interventions quickly. The lack of
planning and the desire to rush out quickly must be
reversed if R2P is to prove a long-term benefit.
The ICISS suggested focusing on the key areas of
security, justice and reconciliation, and development.
Security requires functioning police and armed forces that
are loyal to the new government, properly trained, and
willing to perform the tasks they are assigned. In many
cases, security requires disarming and demobilizing factions.
Justice and reconciliation requires a functioning judicial
system. Countries also must consider options of trials,
truths commissions, or amnesties for those involved in the
previous government. Long-term stability requires economic
development to provide jobs, services, and a viable tax base.
In Libya, NATO operations were ended on October 31,
2011 less than two weeks after Gadaffi was killed. An
interim government and cabinet headed by Prime Minister
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Dr. Abdurrahim El Keib was formed. To assist the new
government, the U.N. authorized the United Nations Support
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in September 2011, but security
operations were fully in the hands of the interim government
(Kumar 2012). Steps have been taken to rebuild the military
and police forces, but it will take time for them to be seen as
fully functioning and legitimate. One major challenge the
new government faces is disarming the factions and assuring
control of what once were major and advanced weapons in
the Libyan military’s arsenal.
The impact of weak
government control of security was highlighted by the
September 11, 2012 attack on the American diplomatic
mission at Benghazi. The attack was carried out by wellarmed Islamist militants who have gained in powerin the
vacuum of weak government control. Weak government
control of weapons and territory has also affected the region
as equipment and militants have moved to Algeria, Mali, and
Chad.
The new government’s efforts at justice began with a
jarring start when Gaddafi was killed after his capture.
Other revenge killings occurred, but they did not spiral out
of control. The government,therefore,has begun to consider
establishing a truth commission expressly modeled on those
in Chile, Argentina and South Africa. The focus would be on
fact finding and reconciliation rather than retribution.
Trials, though, are likely for the leaders of the Gadaffi
regime. Again the international world must keep focus on
Libya so that fair standards are established, and must offer
it technical assistance when requested.
On July 7, 2012, the National Transitional Council
supervised democratic elections for a 200 member General
National Congress to replace the Council. The assembly was
to choose a prime minister and organize parliamentary
elections in 2013. The process did not proceed smoothly as
in October 2012, Libya's Prime Minister-elect Mustafa A.G.
Abushagur stepped downafter failing a second time to win
parliamentary approval for a new cabinetA process to write a
constitution will also be determined to be followed by a
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referendum.
These various moves show progress in
establishing a new government that can bring security and
justice, but a stable government with full control of its own
territory is still years away.
On development, Libya does have an advantage compared
to many possible R2P cases, namely that its oil and large
foreign assets provide it with major resources. Allocating
those resources in an equitable way is more of a challenge.
Before the war, income distribution was extremely skewed.
This reality will not suddenly reverse, so the new government
will face the challenge of citizens with higher expectations,
but no immediate prospects for long-term, equitable growth.
If Libya falls into political instability, violence, or
economic stagnation, or if it requires major long-term
international commitments of time and resources, it will be
harder to convince the international community to support
future R2P actions.

4. Libya’s Implications for Syria and Beyond
At the beginning of the intervention in Libya, Obama and
others stressed that the Libyan case was unusual and
should not be seen as establishing set criteria and
expectations for future actions. The reality, though, is that
since Libya was the first major use of force for R2P actions,
this case will have major implications for the norm’s future.
For those favoring the development of R2P, the very fact of
action in Libya with U.N. consent is an important milestone.
However, the operation brought back many of the unresolved
issues of the past and reinforced many of the critics’ worries.
It also showed the major challenges of implementation and
rebuilding that have until now received less attention in
R2Pdiscussions.
Overall, the use of R2P in Libya has
decreased the likelihood of actions elsewhere. As Evans, one
of the long-term architects of the policy noted, “Consensus
has collapsed amid recrimination about how the NATO-led
implementation of the Security Council’s Libya mandate‘to
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of
attack’ was carried out (Philps 2012).
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As protests and government crackdowns escalated in
Syria, the Special Advisers of the Secretary-General on the
Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect
called “on the international community to take immediate,
decisive action to meet the responsibility to protect
populations at further risk of atrocity crimes in Syria, taking
into consideration the full range of tools available under the
United Nations Charter” (Statement 2012). Action, though,
has been minor and slow as countries consider the realities
of Syria’s geopolitical realities and the memories of R2P in
Libya.
Russian officials have been the most explicit about the
connection of Libya and Syria. They repeatedly have said
that they will not accept a “Libya-style” solution for Syria.
Putin recently wrote, “Learning from that bitter experience,
we are against any U.N. Security Council resolutions that
could be interpreted as a signal for military interference in
the domestic processes of Syria” (“Russia’s Putin” 2012).
Russia has long-standing ties with Syria, sees those ties as a
way to keep Russian influence in Middle East discussions,
continues to sell Syria military supplies, and has a naval
base in Syria. Russia’s stance on many issues also has
toughened as Putin reasserts power asPresident. Russia
thus has both philosophical and practical objections to
major action in Syria. Additionally, China has renewed
focus on protecting sovereignty. An editorial in the People′s
Dailyreferred to Libya as “a negative case study” (GarwoodGowers2012). Russia and China have used a double veto in
the Security Council to block even mild punishments for
Syria. India, South Africa and others also appear to have
become more opposed to intervention as a result of events in
Libya. Indian U.N. representative Hardeep Singh Puri noted
“the Libyan case has already given R2P a bad name”
(Beauchamp 2012).
The Western countries, too, are wary after Libya, so there
has been much less discussion of using force. When force
was raised as an option in the U.S. Senate, military officials
responded by explaining why military operations in Syria
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would be much more difficult than in Libya. Pragmatic
constraints, not the responsibility to protect civilians, carry
the day.
The previously discussed unresolved issues about
R2Preemerged in discussions of Syria. Great focus has been
put on sovereignty. Russia’s Lavrov has argued, “We never
said President Assad remaining in power is the solution to
the crisis. What we did say is that it is up to the Syrians
themselves to decide how to run their country” (“Russia
Won’t” 2012).Lavrov also has noted that, “regime change is
not our profession” (MacFarquhar 2012). Further, Russia
and China have been hesitant to pass resolutions with any
mention of punishment for fear that the process will end in
calls for force and regime change.
Ruan Zongze, vice
president of the China Institute of International Studies,
argued that Libya shows R2P “proved nothing more than the
pursuit of hegemony in the name of humanity” (2012). The
Libyan case therefore seems to have sensitized key players to
such a point that major R2P action seems highly unlikely.
The Syria case also shows the ongoing issues around who
can authorize action. In this case, the vetoes of Russian and
China have blocked action. More subtly, the threat of vetoes
has led to repeated efforts to waterdown resolutions, for
example by taking out any mention of the word sanctions.
This reinforces the fact that, with current U.N. rules, future
R2P resolutions are likely to be blocked, or to be so toothless
that they put little additional pressure on states. Frustrated
with the Security Council stalemate, those wanting action
turned to the General Assembly. In February 2012, the
General Assembly supported a resolution condemning
human rights violations and calling for Assad to step down.
The vote was 137-12 with 17 abstentions. The General
Assembly resolution explicitly built off the ideas of the Arab
League, another instance ofregional groups becoming active
in pushing for internal reforms.
Neither the General
Assembly nor the Arab League, though,hasbeen able to
convince Assad to end the violence or consider stepping
down. These resolutions also have not convinced Russia or
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China to change their stance. General Assembly resolutions
can indicate global preferences, but R2P actions depend on
the politics of the Security Council. R2P supporters like
Canada’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axelworthy
have returned to arguing for reform of U.N. vetoes, but this
will surely fall on deaf ears yet again (Axelworthy 2012).
Overall, it appears that if R2P is not dead, it is on life
support. R2P prevention efforts may continue, although it is
not clear that these efforts really need the term R2P to move
forward. On the more dramatic idea of R2P interventions,
key issues have never been resolved and recent events have
only highlighted these issues and heightened critics’ fears.
The terms have changed from humanitarian intervention to
R2P, but the debates are largely the same. In the wake of
the Libyan case, interventions are likely to dwindle much as
they did for the first decade of the 21st century following the
backlash against the humanitarian interventions of the
1990s.
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